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Group Morality and Forms of Life
Dewey, Wittgenstein and Inter-Subjectivity
Rick Davis
1 This paper argues that among the connections between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and
the  pragmatist  tradition  is  the  commonality  between  Dewey’s  account  of  the
development  of  group  morality  and  Wittgenstein’s  concept,  ‘forms  of  life.’  To  my
knowledge there is nothing in the literature that has focused on the affinity between
these aspects of each philosopher’s work. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the
growing literature on Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the pragmatist tradition in a way
that  prompts  further  discussion  about  concepts  that  are  not  so  often  addressed  by
scholars making similar connections.
2 This paper proceeds in the following way: first, I provide a brief review of literature that
has alluded to connections between the philosophies of Dewey and Wittgenstein; second,
I  briefly  review  and  show  important  connections  between  the  aspects  of  each
philosopher’s work with which this research is concerned: Dewey’s group morality and
Wittgenstein’s form of life; third, I raise and address potential and anticipated criticisms;
finally,  I  conclude  by  reiterating  my  main  points  and  stating  why  this  research  is
important.  My overarching argument here is  that  both the form of  life  concept  and
Dewey’s account of group morality are dependent on inter-subjective experience.
 
Prior Work on Dewey and Wittgenstein
3 Despite the growing literature on Wittgenstein and Pragmatism, there is  surprisingly
little, if any, systematic study dedicated exclusively to the philosophies of Dewey and
Wittgenstein in relation to one another. Robin Haack’s excellent essay (1984) is perhaps
the most satisfying treatment of the connections between Wittgenstein and Dewey, but
this analysis is strongly supplemented by equally thorough treatments of Peirce, James,
Rorty, and pragmatism more generally. This takes away from the force of the connections
she establishes.  Nonetheless,  Haack’s  insights  are  invaluable  to  any study looking to
establish connections. For instance, she argues that there are ‘naturalistic’ elements in
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both Dewey and Wittgenstein and that these elements have similar relationships to the
two  philosopher’s  accounts  of  “meaning,  behavior,  and  justification”  (1984:  163).
Moreover,  Haack observes that Wittgenstein and Dewey both associate meaning with
behavior. In Philosophical Investigations (1952), Wittgenstein writes that in most cases the
meaning of any linguistic item is its use. Since Wittgenstein understood language as an
activity, this is close to Dewey’s claim that “Meaning is primarily a property of behavior”
(in Haack 1984: 164). This, Haack concludes, means both Wittgenstein and Dewey hold
that language – its structure and meaning – cannot be understood if divorced from its
context.
4 Richard Rorty’s (1982) well-known account makes strong claims about consistencies in
Dewey’s and Wittgenstein’s work within the history of philosophy, but he spends more
time  comparing  the  so-called  ‘Early’  and  ‘Later’  Wittgenstein  to  the  philosophy  and
significance  of  Kant  and  Dewey,  respectively.  “The  later  Wittgenstein  belongs  with
Dewey,”  he  writes, “as  the  earlier  Wittgenstein  belongs with  Kant”  (1982:  28).  This
comparison obscures more than it elucidates, however; connections between Dewey and
Wittgenstein are a part of a broader claim about the import of Wittgenstein’s philosophy
in relation to changes in philosophy as practiced during his early and later work. As a
result,  Dewey’s  philosophy  is  compared  to  Wittgenstein’s  within  the  history  of
professional  philosophy.  Important  claims are made,  but  not  toward the sole  end of
establishing  affinities  between  the  two.  Rather,  Rorty  more  situates  Wittgenstein’s
philosophy in the Western philosophical tradition. 
5 The significance of Rorty’s essay, however, should not be underestimated. It has been in
opposition to Rorty’s interpretation that some of the best work regarding Dewey and
Wittgenstein has been advanced. For instance, Richard Prawat (1995) rejects Rorty’s claim
that Dewey was a postmodernist before his time, but he goes on to entertain the notion
that in being critical of traditional philosophical problems, Dewey does move away from
philosophy as  practiced at  the time.  Through his  project  of  “reconstruction” (Dewey
1920), Prawat suggests, Dewey was able to develop and “move into” a new language game
within professional philosophy. What this means is that Dewey was able to establish a
vocabulary regarding topics of his interest that his peers were willing to accept as a part
of ‘legitimate’  philosophical discourse.  This falls short,  though, of the being on equal
footing with ideas developed and advanced in the so-called linguistic  turn,  since the
language of pragmatism was seen as a subset of a broader and accepted philosophical
discourse.
6 Prawat  goes  on  to  discuss  how  Dewey’s  alternative  to  the  mind-body problem  in
traditional philosophy was a “triangular relationship between the individual, community,
and  the  world  mediated  by  socially  constructed  ideas”  (1995:  14).  This  is  similar  to
Wittgenstein’s  remarks on the ‘from of  life’  concept,  although it  does not  seem that
Wittgenstein was directing these remarks at the mind-world problem as much as toward
philosophy itself.  For  Wittgenstein,  as  we  will  see,  there  is  an  inherent  relationship
among the individual, community, and the social conventions rooted therein. For both
philosophers,  then,  communally  developed  and  agreed  upon  beliefs,  practices,  etc.,
contribute to meaning and conduct.  Language use and what is  and is not considered
legitimate behaviors, like any communal activities, are the result of cooperation.
7 Other approaches are less entangled in differences in interpretation: James Farr (2004),
for example, aptly argues that there are elements in Dewey and Wittgenstein that can
contribute to the ‘Social  Capital’  literature in the social  sciences.  This is  an accurate
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observation.  Both Dewey and Wittgenstein are  concerned with the manner in which
agreement in a community grounds activity,  behavior,  and communication. Both also
hold that this strengthens group solidarity. This can be a powerful supplement to Social
Capital Theory: Social Capital Theory holds that strong social ties among members of a
community contribute to the betterment of a community in a variety of ways. These ties,
it  is  maintained,  have dissipated overtime,  culminating in  a  dire  social  arrangement
perpetuated by a variety of  factors (depending on which theorists one consults)  that
encourages and/or enables a reclusive life over public and civic engagement (Putnam
2000).  Given the emphasis on communally agreed upon standards of  conduct,  among
other  aspects  of  social  life  in  both  Dewey  and  Wittgenstein,  it  is  appropriate  to
incorporate them into debates concerning the concept of Social Capital and its role in
group life.
8 These  and  other  studies  give  those  who  wish  to  show  strong  connections  between
Wittgenstein and Dewey a good place to start. It is also evident in the limited literature
that many of these connections are to be found in aspects of each thinker’s philosophy
with  which  this  research  is  concerned:  how  group  dynamics,  norms,  and  practices
influence and indeed organize and guide the activities of the individuals of which a given
community is comprised. This, I believe, justifies pursuing this research. Both Dewey and
Wittgenstein  see  the  demarcation between community  and individual  as  one  that  is
blurred to a significant extent. For both, there is no other way to understand such a
relationship. An individual detached from her social context is nothing more than a social
fiction. 
 
Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Inter-Subjective Experience
9 In Dewey’s middle period, he places a great deal of emphasis on the dynamics of group
life, especially as they pertain to communal practices and ethical norms. For Dewey, there
is an intimate and reciprocal relationship between the individual and the community of
which she is a part. This, according to Dewey, has been the hallmark of group life since
antiquity: “Individual judgment,” he suggests, “is caught up, repeated, and plays its part
in  group  opinion”  (1972:  56).  The  inverse  is  also  true.  Broader  communal  or  group
morality influences the manner in which a person develops her moral system. Dewey
writes, “customs and mores have in them an element of social approval, which makes
them  vehicles  for  [individual]  moral  judgments”  in  that  one’s  moral  judgments  are
reinforced  by  the  fact  that  they  are  derived  from  a  communally  approved  moral
system.Although these judgments can at times “sink to the level of mere habit” there are
safeguards  derived  from group  life  that  bring  them back  to  the  level  of  “conscious
agencies.” Dewey lists a few:
The  education  of  the  younger,  immature  members  of  the  group  and  their
preparation  for  full  membership.  (2)  The  constraint  and  restraint  of  refractory
members and the adjustment of conflicting interest. (3) Occasions which involve
some notable danger or crisis and therefore call for greater attention to […] avert
disaster. (1972: 59)
10 For my purposes here, it is only important to note that institutionalized group practices
not only provide members of a community with their initial code of behavior, but also
provide the means by which this behavior is regulated, suggesting that certain actions are
grounded in the dynamics of  group life.  In  this  way,  these “conscious  agencies”  are
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encouraged by the community to remain an engaged part of public life as opposed to
devolving into passive beliefs or mere habit (59).
11 The standards of group morality, Dewey continues, are social, but only unconsciously so.
Dewey puts it better when he explains that standards of group morality are not those that
“each member deliberately makes his own. [Rather,] he takes it as a matter of course. He
is in the clan, “with the gang”; he thinks and acts accordingly” (1972: 72). This means that
the  contours  of  group  morality  are  internalized  early  in  one’s  life  and  become
increasingly entrenched the more one participates in communal practices governed by,
and rooted in,  those  standards.  Indeed,  “The young are  carefully  trained to  observe
them” (1972: 55). Dewey continues:
Whenever we find groups of men living together […] we find that there are certain
ways of acting which are common to the group […] There are approved ways of
acting, common to the group, and handed down from generation to generation.
Such approved ways of doing and acting are customs. (1972: 56)
12 These customs in turn influence and guide individual conduct: “they imply the judgment
of  the  group that  they  are  to  be  followed.  The  welfare  of  the  group is  regarded as
somehow imbedded in them” (1972: 54-5). This means that a person’s actions are either
validated or invalidated depending on the extent to which those actions accord to group
standards.  This  is  different  from  other  ethical  traditions  such  as  utilitarian  or
deontological approaches in that an ethical system is derived from, and grounded in, a
particular  communal  context  as  opposed to  adhering to  abstract  principles  or  social
calculus.
13 Daniel Savage (2005) has examined group life and morality as articulated by Dewey and
has coined the phrase ‘intersubjective verification.’ Savage’s concept is helpful in coming
to a clearer understanding of Dewey’s account of the development of group morality and
is therefore worth briefly reviewing here. The phrase is quite intuitive: it is meant to
refer  to  the  aspects  of  Dewey’s  philosophy  that  hold  individual  moral  values  and
standards to be derived from, and logically justified by, group or communal customs and
mores.  Savage also notes the inter-subjective experience goes both ways:  ideas often
begin  with  individuals  and  are  inter-subjectively  verified  by  the  broader  group  or
community. He provides the excellent example of the technological innovation leading to
the development of the heavy plow:
Motivation for the invention came from dissatisfaction with, or criticism of, current
methods of cultivation. Although the idea for the new design must have originated
in  a  single  individual’s  imagination,  this  individual  did not  have  to  start  from
scratch. His or her idea contributed to a progressive development of cultivation […]
It was [subsequently] verified as the best existing plow through the intersubjective
experience of individual farmers. The spread of its use across Europe was the result
of the communication of its effectiveness. (2005: 11)
14 Moreover, inter-subjective verification applies not only to technological innovation but
also to normative ethical and political ideas. In almost the same breath, Savage argues:
The concept of individual rights has a similar history. It was motivated by criticism
of, and therefore dissatisfaction with, existing political institutions […] It was the
best idea regarding the organization of a political community devoted to the good
of  its  members  that  had  been  developed  up  until  that  time.  This  was  verified
intersubjectively through the experience and communication of the populations of
Western Europe and North America. (2005: 11)
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15 The emerging point is that ideas – be they in regard to technological innovations or the
development of normative ethical and political ideas – operate within the intimate
relationship of the individual and community. The individual is at once the product of,
and a contributor to, social norms and practices. This is the crux of Dewey’s account of
group morality and is consistent with his pragmatist philosophy more generally. This
connection between morality and practical problem-solving is something that is echoed
in  Wittgenstein’s  philosophy.  For  Wittgenstein,  there  is  also  an  inherent  connection
among group standards of conduct and a variety of actions. 
16 Dewey’s account is similar to Wittgenstein’s remarks on what he calls a ‘form of life.’
However, given its importance to his later philosophy, the ‘form of life’ concept is rarely
mentioned by Wittgenstein. Upon further examination, however, the thoughtful reader
understands that other concepts important to Wittgenstein’s philosophy are dependent
thereon. For instance, to paraphrase one commentator, the term ‘form of life’ helps one
to understand that the manner in which we develop our proficiency in language games is
dependent on context and a socially embedded complex of language, rules, behavior and
action (Ayer 1985). In Wittgenstein’s words: “to imagine a language is to imagine a form
of life” (1952: § 19). What this suggests is that our ‘form of life’ is an “interweaving of
culture, world view, and language” (Glock 1996: 124). This being the case, a proficient
understanding  of  the  context-dependent  nature  of  what  Wittgenstein  calls  language
games helps one better understand the role of the form of life concept in Wittgenstein’s
philosophy. 
17 The  connection  between  language  games  and  a  form  of  life  becomes  clearer  as
Wittgenstein proceeds: in response to his interlocutor’s inquiry in the Investigations about
what constitutes truth or falsehood in a language game, Wittgenstein explains that the
truth and falsehood of an utterance is determined by “what human beings say; and it is in
their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinion, but rather in a
form of life” (1952: § 241). This means that linguistic practices are derived from one’s
environment,  a  community  or  culture  that  is  of  course  shared  with  others.  Social
convention binds human beings together in a form of life based on a general agreement
about a diverse set of social interactions. As Wittgenstein suggests as early as the Blue and
Brown  Books (1958),  to  imagine  a  language  is  to  imagine  a  “culture”  (1958:  134).
Accordingly,  a  form of  life  can be understood as  “a culture or  social  formation,  the
totality of  communal activities in which language-games are embedded” (Glock 1996:
124-5).
18 Related to the concept of language games is Wittgenstein understanding of meaning as
use.  For  Wittgenstein,  meanings  of  terms are  not  their  referent  or  an abstract  idea;
rather, meaning is derived from the manner in which terms are used in regular social
interaction, in everyday conversation. As he explains,
For a large class of cases of the use of the word “meaning” – even if not for all cases
– the word can be explained thus: The meaning of the word is its use in language.
(1952: § 189)
19 In  fact,  the  later  Wittgenstein  is  hostile  to  referential  theories  of  meaning  that
characterized his early work. In the opening of the Investigations,  Wittgenstein refutes
Augustine’s account of language. He explains the account holds,
a certain picture of the essence of human language: that the words of language
name objects – that propositions are combinations of such names. In this picture of
language we find the root of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This
Group Morality and Forms of Life
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012
5
meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.
(1952: § 1)
20 The referential theory of meaning is problematic for several reasons. As one example,
given this account, after the object ceases to exist the meaning remains. How, then, can a
referential theory of meaning allow for such a term to be meaningful. What Wittgenstein
sees as the shortcomings of such theories of meaning leads him to believe that one cannot
understand a language until she sees how it functions in a form of life, as a “pattern in the
weave of life recurring in different variations” (1952: § 43).
21 Not only are the concepts of forms of life, language games, and meaning as use intimately
connected,  but there is  also a connection between these concepts and Wittgenstein’s
discussion of rules and rule following. As Mark Addis notes, “a rule, as with meaning, is
rooted in a form of life” (2006: 104). Similarly, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein writes,
“the  word  language-game is  used  here  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  the  speaking  of  a
language is part of a [rule-governed] activity, or of a form of life” (1952: § 23, emphasis in
original).  Furthermore, he states “obeying a rule is a practice” (1952: § 99).  Language
games and related conduct, simply put, adhere to rules. These rules, of course, emerge
from social context. 
22 Like the above-mentioned concepts, following a rule is embedded in a form of life. For
Wittgenstein, a rule, like meaning, is not abstract, nor does it govern activity in the same
way  with  every  application.  To  the  contrary,  he  thought  that  much  of  the
misunderstanding of  rules and rule-following can be attributed to the fact that most
people understand rules as being applied in the same way in all situations. Wittgenstein
understood rules as normalized behavior in a particular form of life. He writes: “to obey a
rule, to make a report, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).” As such,
rules do not transcend their applications,  but rather their applications are rooted in
different social contexts, different forms of life (1952: § 202).
23 For Wittgenstein, activity in linguistic communities is governed by customs and social
convention based on agreement in a form of life. This is not limited to linguistic activity,
but extends to all activity (1952: § 241). These activities are in turn rule-governed, the
rules having been established by agreement in a form of life. This is similar to the claim
made by Dewey that different kinds of activity are based on agreement in a community.
Furthermore,  for  both  Dewey  and  Wittgenstein  social  practices  are  provided  with  a
significant degree of legitimacy by virtue of their being accepted and seemingly validated
by the broader community, as well as by past generations. These customs are seen as
having been inter-subjectively verified by the group. Concomitantly, these same practices
serve as a starting point for individual innovation in regard to group practices that, if
deemed useful, will also be inter-subjectively verified. For both Dewey and Wittgenstein,
then, inherited customs influence social conduct, interactions, and practices of all kinds.
Ideas  concerning  social  practices  spread  through  social  approval,  through  inter-
subjective experience.
24 Both Dewey and Wittgenstein understood that group activity is governed by a complex of
rules, traditions, norms, etc. They saw group life as an elaborate social matrix established
and perpetuated by agreement among the members of the group. Both also realized that
this agreement and the resulting complex of social conventions can be blindly accepted
by successive generations, and this might have negative implications. But the affinity
between Dewey’s account of the development of group morality and Wittgenstein’s forms
of life that concerns this research lays in their shared emphasis on the important role of
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inter-subjectivity. Both the concepts of Dewey’s group morality and Wittgenstein’s forms
of life depend on the transfer and approval  of  ideas.  The inter-subjective experience
binds groups and forms of life together in social arrangements, the basis of which is a




25 At this point some objections might be raised. One of the most obvious might be that
Dewey and Wittgenstein are not directing their analyses to comparable topics. It is true
that Wittgenstein was primarily a philosopher of language, and Dewey was, for lack of a
better term, a social theorist. Therefore, it could be argued that they are concerned with
different  things (language and morality,  respectively).  But  insofar as  each account is
concerned with interaction between the individual and social customs in regard to social
action,  there  is  a  strong  connection.  Each  acknowledges  that  social  customs  have  a
significant influence on the development of one’s basis for action. Similarly, there is a
voluminous literature on the relation between ethics and moral action. So even though
on a superficial level there might seem to be some conceptual incongruity, upon further
examination it is clear there is consistency in these concepts in regard to social action
that is guided by social conventions.
26 Another objection that might be raised, similar to the first, is that Dewey places a lot of
focus on the extent to which an individual’s actions and ideas can influence adopted
modes of social behavior by being integrated into group morality – what some might call
moral agency. Wittgenstein is comparatively silent on this point. Wittgenstein is more
concerned with how what one learns from a form of life influences their knowledge of,
and action in, the world. This does not mean, though, that for Wittgenstein an individual
is somehow trapped in the worldview established by her form of life. For instance, in his
discussion on rule-following Wittgenstein explains that although one is taught to observe
rules,  the  nature  of  those  rules  allows  for  some  deviation,  some  latitude  for  the
individual.  Such behavior might of course be deemed inappropriate since it would be
inconsistent with a form of life, but the point is that individuals are not held captive.
They are merely limited by the social norms that comprise them. The same can be said of
any  established  worldview,  which  in  his  subsequent  work  Wittgenstein  addresses
(Wittgenstein 1969).
27 Finally, it might be argued that my treatment of the ‘form of life’ concept is incorrect or
incomplete. The argument can be made that my account is incomplete in that it spends a
roughly equivalent amount of time discussing related concepts. However, as mentioned,
the term ‘form of life’ is mentioned only a few times in Wittgenstein’s published work,
and therefore supplemental  concepts,  such as  those mentioned above,  are needed to
elucidate this idea. This is an appropriate course of action because a proficient reading of
Wittgenstein  shows  the  extent  to  which  language  games,  meaning  as  use,  and rule-
following are dependent on a form of life. Given the scarce remarks on the concept, in
concert  with  how  these  remarks  explicate  the  connection  among  other  important
concepts,  a discussion of forms of life necessitate a discussion of these other, related
concepts.
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Conclusion 
28 I have argued in this brief paper that the similarities between Dewey’s account of the
development of group morality and Wittgenstein’s concept of forms of life are among
connections between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the pragmatist tradition. I have done
this  by  focusing  on  how  both  concepts  can  be  understood  as  dependent  on  inter-
subjectively established group customs. I have also argued that Dewey and Wittgenstein
see communal life as one in which an individual is of one’s community as opposed to
being detached in some way. The implications of this, I have argued, are that one’s action
– be they moral or linguistic – are governed by rules that are accepted as legitimate. In
short: both Dewey and Wittgenstein see group life as an interwoven, context-dependent
system of language, behavior, action, and more. In this way, I have attempted to show the
extent  to  which Wittgenstein’s  philosophy and the pragmatist  tradition (represented
here by Dewey) are in accord with one another.
29 I also raised and addressed some potential and anticipated criticisms: that Dewey and
Wittgenstein’s  approaches  are  directed  at  different  issues,  that  Dewey  places  much
emphasis on the extent to which an individual can influence a group’s system of customs,
whereas Wittgenstein is more concerned with what can be called epistemological issues,
and finally that my handling of the Wittgenstein’s concept of form of life is incomplete. In
the prior section, I address these potential criticisms in turn and argue that they can be
resolved by a careful reading of both Dewey and Wittgenstein. Although neither, to my
knowledge, employ the term ‘inter-subjectivity,’ the concept itself teases out connections
between the two concepts with which this study is concerned.
30 This research picks up where previous, relevant research leaves off: focusing solely on
connections between Dewey and Wittgenstein. Such a study can only contribute to the
growing  literature  concerning  Wittgenstein  and  pragmatism,  even  if  only  through
stimulating more discussion about the potential relationship. That is, even if others do
not agree that these connections exist or are important, this study will have achieved the
objective toward which is directed: a contribution to the ongoing and important debates
relating to Wittgenstein and pragmatism. This is important because it fills a ‘gap’ in the
existing literature. 
31 Furthermore, by establishing affinities between what are sometimes considered vague or
ambiguous Wittgensteinian concepts with concepts that are part of a seemingly more
coherent philosophical system such Dewey’s might help to stimulate discussion on these
concepts by providing a viable interpretation. The only way philosophical problems (or
puzzles)  are  worked  out  is  through  discussion.  Providing  even  a  possibly  ‘correct’
interpretation  of  difficult  concepts  will  no  doubt  contribute  to  debates  that  seek  to
elucidate these concepts. Concomitantly, through comparison each philosopher’s account
of group life is made clearer. To put this differently, there is a mutual clarification when
comparing two or more philosophers in that by teasing out similarities, each concept or
philosophy necessitates a careful reading of each philosopher.
32 Also, Dewey and Wittgenstein were contemporaries, although it is not clear that they
read one another (although Wittgenstein was quite fond of  James and was therefore
exposed to pragmatism). Regardless, the contemporaneous relationship suggests research
such as this that establishes strong similarities between two or more philosophers holds
promise for studies in the history of philosophy. Through establishing these (and other)
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kinds of similarities one can better understand the interplay of philosophy and other
social  factors  in  a  given  period.  Too  often,  philosophies  are  treated  as  addressing
perennial, trans-generational issues, which is not counter-productive in itself, but it is
unrealistic to think that inquiries into these ideas proceeds in manner independent of
historical context. The political historian and theorists Quentin Skinner (1988), who by
his own account is heavily influenced by Wittgenstein, argues that although philosophy is
often concerned with such ‘timeless’ questions, such an approach is of lesser value if it
ignores historical and linguistic context.
33 Finally, in showing affinities between Dewey and Wittgenstein, other comparisons might
be prompted and established, not only between Dewey and Wittgenstein but also among
Wittgenstein and other pragmatists: as an example, Peirce’s interest in the manner in
which  we  come  to  develop  our  doubts  and  beliefs  bears  a  resemblance  to  many  of
Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty (1969). Also, James’ holism is something that can at
once be compared to Dewey and Wittgenstein (Haack 1984). Given the diversity of views
within the pragmatist tradition, this holds great promise. If parallels can be drawn among
Wittgenstein and more than one pragmatist (and this has been done, but more research
in  this  area  is  needed),  the  connections  between the  two traditions  will  seem more
evident.  If  ideas  between,  say,  James  or  Holmes  and  Wittgenstein  are  shown  in  a
convincing  way,  this  is  indicative  of  an  inherent  connection  between  Wittgenstein’s
philosophy. Many of pragmatists have ideas that correspond with many of Wittgenstein’s
concepts. This research can be a step in thedirection of demonstrating these parallels. 
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ABSTRACTS
In this paper, I attempt to establish connections between the pragmatist philosophical tradition
and the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. I argue that among these connections is the
affinity between John Dewey’s account of the development of group morality as articulated in his
early work and Wittgenstein’s admittedly vague concept, ‘form of life.’ I argue that this affinity is
evident  in  that  both  are  dependent  on  inter-subjective  experience.  Moreover,  both  Dewey’s
account of the development of group morality and Wittgenstein’s concept of form of life suggests
an intimate relationship between the individual and the community. I argue further that both
Dewey’s account of group morality and Wittgenstein’s form of life concept hold that there is a
significant influence of inherited norms, conventions, traditions, etc., on the development of the
individual  and  her  conduct  in  a  variety  of  social  interactions.  I  go  on  to  raise  and  address
potential  and  anticipated  criticisms.  In  this  section  I  take  what  I  consider  to  be  the  most
penetrating of the potential criticisms of the arguments presented in this paper: that Dewey and
Wittgenstein  direct  their  analyses  at  different  issues  (the  former directs  his  analysis  toward
group moral development and social issues, while the latter directs his toward linguistic activity
and its grounding social context), that Dewey focuses much of his attention on moral agency,
whereas Wittgenstein is more concerned with what might be called epistemological issues, and
finally that my treatment of the form of life concept is incomplete in that I spend a roughly
proportionate amount of time discussing related concepts: language games, meaning as use, and,
to a lesser extent, rule- following. I respond to these criticisms in turn by arguing that a careful
reading of these aspects of each philosopher’s work circumvents such criticisms. The goal of this
paper  is  to  contribute  to  the  growing  literature  on  connections  between  Wittgenstein’s
philosophy and the Pragmatist tradition. The subject matter might also be a contribution to the
history of philosophy and possibly have implications for epistemology. There is also the hope
that in establishing commonalities between the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Dewey one can
provide an interpretation of  some of  the more vague concepts  in  Wittgenstein’s  philosophy,
prompting further discussion on these concepts. Finally, this research might pave the way for
further  research  into  connections  among  different  aspects  of  Dewey’s  and  Wittgenstein’s
philosophies. This paper is a first step toward a study of a much larger scope and should not be
taken as conclusive.
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